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A PLEA FOR A MODERN DEFINITION AND CLAS-
SIFICATION OF REAL PROPERTY.
In the course of my teaching, it has seemed to me that a number
of what have, heretofore, been regarded as essential preliminary
conceptions in the law of real property, require fuller treatment
than is accorded them in the text-books, and that the definition and
classification of real property should be re-modeled. The object
of this paper is to go over some of the fundamental definitions in
the law of real property, to frame comprehensive ones, and to
suggest what the modern definition and scope of that law should
be. While it repeats much that is elementary, the reason and the
excuse is that I have been able to find no adequate definition of
real property as that property is known in the law, so have had
to frame one of my own out of the elements. The elementary is
often the least understood, and is, in fact, just that in the law
of real property which, to-day, for student purposes, most requires
careful consideration.
PROPERTY.
To begin then, at the beginning, the word "property" is derived
from the Latin word proprius, which means one's own. The word
"property" means either (j) anything corporeal or incorporeal which
a person may acquire, own and dispose of to the exclusion of some
other person, or (2) any legal or equitable incorporeal right to or
interest in such corporeal or incorpeal thing, which right a person
may acquire, own and dispose of to the exclusion of others.
Exactness requires that the corporeal or incorporeal thing which
is the subject of ownership be discriminated from the incorporeal
right to or interest in it, even though the incorporeal right to or
interest in the corporeal or incorporeal thing is itself the subject of
ownership. The thing should be called property, and the right to.
or iterest in it, should be called a right of property. A right of
property is a right to the exclusive enjoyment of any property, or
to the exclusive enjoyment of some part of, or undivided interest in
such property. Unfortunately, however, the distinction between
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the thing owned and the rights of ownership in it has not been
adhered to by judges and writers in the common law, even where
it has been made, and the confusion between the two is now so
great that it is necessary often to use the word "property" to cover
rights of, in and to property.
I repeat then, that at common law, the word "property" means
either (i) anything corporeal or incorporeal which a person may
acquire, own and dispose of to the exclusion of some other person,
or (2) any legal or equitable incorporeal right to, or interest in
such corporeal or incorporeal thing, which right a person may
acquire, own and dispose of to the exclusion of others.
Property, so defined, consisted at common law of (i) real
property, comprising things real, certain incorporeal interests in
things real, and a few things personal and interests in things per-
sonal, falling under the head of hereditaments, and (2) personal
property, comprising things personal, certain incorporeal interests
in things personal, and certain incorporeal interests in things real.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY.
The broad distinction between real property and personal prop-
erty was, and, in general, is that between (I) immovable things
and rights in them, and (2) movable things and rights in them.
But this distinction was and is far from exact, largely because
both things and the rights of ownership in things have been and
to-day are called property.
The distinction between real property and personal property
which is the most important in theory, has been found in what
becomes of each after the death of its owner. At common law,
when a man died and left no will, his real property went to his
heir direct, and if he left a will, it went directly to his devisee; but
his personal property went to his administrator if he left no will
or to his executor if he left a will, and only after the decedent's
debts were paid was distributed, in the case of intestacy, to the
next of kin specified by statute, or, in the case of a will to those
named by the will. This distinction was very important in Eng-
land, where, in the first instance, the heir was the eldest son, but
in the first instance, the next of kin comprised the widow and all
the children. It is much less important in many of the States
of the United States, where, by statute, the same persons are heirs
and distributees, and the administrators and executors are authorized
by statute to sell, lease or mortgage the decendent's real estate to
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pay his debts and the legacies charged upon the land, where the
personal estate is insufficient. Still, the distinction exists and is
important, even in these States where the same persons are heirs
and next of kin' ; and it should be held clearly in mind that, in
general (i) real estate goes directly to the heirs or devisees, and
(2) personal property goes directly to the administrators or execu-
tors, and only after the debts of the decedent are paid to the next
of kin or legatees. The chief exception in the case of real estate,
consists of estates for life in tenements which cannot go to any
body, because of their termination on the death of the owner.
Because for certain historical reasons, hereinafter referred to,
certain interests in things real went to a man's personal representa-
tive, in the first instance, instead of to his heir or to the beneficiary
under his will, those interests were held at common law to be
personal property; and in common law States, where the rule has
not been changed by statute, they are to-day held to be personal
property. They are known in the law as chattels real.
REAL PROPERTY.
The words "real property" are modem, and are synonymous
with the feudal words "lands, tenements and hereditaments." The
feudal phrase was awkward, and because the common law allowed
the demandant of lands, tenements and hereditaments to recover
the real thing sued for, while, ordinarily, for other property the
remedy was against the person of the defendant, lands, tenements
and hereditaments came to be balled real property, and the actions
for their recovery real actions, while all other property came to be
called personal property and all other actions, personal actions.
2
Real property, therefore, consists of lands, tenements and here-
ditaments, and to know just what it is, we must scrutinize carefully
each one of these terms.
LANDS.
"Land" means, in general, the exposed parts of the earth, as
contrasted with the parts covered at all times by public navigable
waters. "For land," says Sir Edward Coke, "comprehendeth, in its
legal signification, any ground, soil or earth whatsoever; as arable,
1 For instance in Colorado, an interest in mining claims passes directly to
the heirs of an intestate, and they and not the personal representatives are the
parties to bring suit to quiet title. Keeler vs. Trueman, 15 Colo. 143.
2 Williams on Real Property, *7-
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meadows, pastures, woods, moors, waters, marshes, furzes and
heath."' All such land has at common law an indefinite extent
upwards as well as downwards, and ordinarily includes everything
existing above the soil, and everything in and under the soil.
"Under the term land, therefore, are included the buildings, made
so under the doctrine of accession, and the trees and other things
growing upon the land, under the doctrine of acquisition by pro-
duction, as well as the minerals which may be embedded in the
earth-even trees which have been cut and are lying upon the land
have been said to pass with the land." 2  "Even the air is not free,
for the maxim is that the owner of the soil is owner up to the
height above and down to the depth beneath. I conceive it is
indisputable that to pass over land in a balloon at whatever height,
without the owner's or occupier's license, is technically a trespass." ,
So the water on the land is, for the time being, part of the land.
If the wind blows away the air now over my land, it ceases to be
part of my land, just as the water which runs away does; but for
all that, in the eyes of the law, the air over and the water on my
land, form changing parts of my land. There are other changing
parts of my' land known as emblements (if emblements be defined
to be the growing annual crops planted bv a tenant, which he has
a right to take and carry away, rather than the right to the crops,
in which latter sense the word is also used), and still others known
as fixtures (if fixtures be defined to cover that which was chattel,
which is now land because of actual or constructive attachment to
the land, and which, under certain circumstances and between cer-
tain parties, can legally be restored to its chattel nature by actual
or constructive severance). All these variable parts of land may
be grouped under the description of "everything on, in and over
the soil that goes with it;" and then our first definition of land
will be:
Land is any ground, soil or earth whatsoever, together with
everything on, in and over it that goes with it.
But because the thing which is the subject of property and
the right of ownership of that thing are both of them called prop-
erty, land has still another definition. When we say that a man
inherits land, for instance, we mean that he has succeeded to the
rights of ownership which his ancestor had in the physical thing
12 BI. Com. *i9.
2 Tiedeman on Real Property, Sec. 2.
3 Sir Fred. Pollock's Land Laws, pages i5 i6.
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land. So, too, when we say that a man has conveyed land, we
mean, in any place where the common law rule about chattels real
has not been changed by statute, that he has transferred to some
one an incorporeal freehold interest in the corporeal thing known
as land. In some States by statute, the word "land" is made to
cover interests less than freehold in the corporeal thing known as
land. In Colorado, for instance, "the words 'land' or 'lands' and
the words 'real estate' shall be construed to include lands, tenements
and hereditaments and all rights thereto and all interests therein." I
But at common law, apart from statute, only freehold rights to or
interests in land are land. In other words, the term land has come
to mean at common law a freehold interest in the corporeal thing
known as land, as well as the corporeal thing itself.
2  As the word
land is used by common law writers and judges, it means in a
given case the physical thing which we have already defined as
land, or a freehold interest in that thing, or both.
We are now ready for our final common law definition of land,
viz:
Land is, at common law (I) any ground, soil or earth whatso-
ever, together with everything on, in and over it that goes with
it, or (2) any freehold incorporeal interest in the corporeal thing
known as land, or (3) both. Where a man owns in fee a piece of
real estate, for instance, his land is (i) the physical ground, in-
cluding the minerals, etc., in it, the houses, etc., upon it, and the
air, etc., over it, or (2) the fee simple incorporeal estate in it, or
(3) both.
TENEMENTS.
Tenements is in itself a broader word than land. It includes
everything of a permanent nature which may be held in tenure,
whether that nature be corporeal or incorporeal.
Tenure implies, not only the actual holding of land by one from
12 Mills Ann. Stats. (Colo.), Sec. 4185 Sub. 5.-
2 " The term land, at common law, has a twofold meaning. In its more
general sense, it is held to comprehend any ground, soil or earth whatsoever,
as meadows, pastures, woods, marshes, furze, etc. x Inst. 4, a; 2 Black., Com.
I8. In its more limited sense, the term 'land' denotes the quantity and char-
acter of the interest or estate. which the tenant may own in lands. 'The land
is one thing,' says Plowden. 'and the estate in the land is another thing; for an
estate in the land is a time in the land, or land for a time.' Plowd. 555- When
used to describe the quantity of the estate, 'land' is understood to denote a
freehold estate at least. Black. Com. I8; Shepp. Touch. 88."-Johnson vs-
Richardson, 33 Miss. 46z at P. 464.
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or under another, but also the terms upon which he holds. Tenure
is the mode of holding certain property. It is, collectively, both
the conditions and terms upon which the sovereign power in a
State permits land and incorporeal hereditaments to be held by an
individual, and the rights and obligations which arise from those
conditions and terms. The thing held, whether it be corporeal or
incorporeal, is called a tenement, the holder is called a tenant, and
the manner of the tenant's holding constitutes a tenure. All land
owners in feudal times were tenants directly or indirectly of the
king, and their holding constituted a tenure. The word tenure is
a feudal name.
Tenements, in the phrase, "lands, tenements and hereditaments,"
covers everything which can be held in tenure. Liberunt tenemnen-
turn means freehold, and is "applicable, not only to lands, and
other solid objects, but also to offices, rents, commons and the
like . . . So is an advowson a tenement; and a franchise, an
office, a right of common, a peerage, or other property of the like
unsubstantial kind, are all of them legally speaking tenements." I
Washburn errs in saying that an incorporeal hereditament cannot be
regarded "properly speaking" as a tenement;2 for "a tenement
comprises everything which may be holden, so as to create a tenancy
in the feudal sense of the word, and no doubt it includes things
incorporate, though they do not lie in tenure. ' 3  An incorporeal
hereditament was legally a tenement, and certainly was covered by
the word tenements, in the phrase, lands, tenements and heredita-
ments. A tenement was at common law anything which could be
held in feudal tenure, and in the phrase "lands, tenements and
hereditaments" covered incorporeal hereditaments as well as land.
HEREDITAMENTS.
Hereditaments, is in a way, a still broader word than land or
than tenement, for it embraces everything which may be inherited,
and so includes heirlooms, which are neither lands nor tenements,
yet, by custom, go to the heir; but, in another way, since it does
not cover an estate for life in lands and tenements, it is a narrower
word.
Hereditaments were those things, which on the owner's death,
intestate, went at common law, to the deceased's heir as such.
12 Black. Corn., *17.
2 2Washburn, Real Property, 5th Ed., p. 284 (Book 2, Chap. i *4).
3 3 Kent's Com., *4oi.
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I have used the words "heir as such," because in an estate pur
aiter 'c the heir took, if at all, as a special or as a common occupant
and not as heir. If the estate was limited to his ancestor and heirs
for the life of another, he took as special occupant, but if it ran
only to the ancestor for the life of another, then, if the heir took at
all, it was as common occupant without priority by virtue -of his
heirship. In any event, at common law, the heir of a deceased
owner of an estate pur aiter sie never took the estate as heir, though
in some States to-day he does so by virtue of a State statute.1
Since hereditaments include everything which goes to a man's
heir as such, it includes heirlooms, for "heirlooms are such goods
and personal chattels, as contrary to the nature of chattels shall
go by special custom to the heir along with the inheritance."'2  It
also includes all heritable interests in land and tenements, that is,
all interests larger than life estates.
The term hereditament includes, therefore, heirlooms and all
lands and tenements except estates for life in tenements; and, with
the exception of such estates for life in tenements, nothing is real
property which is not heritable.
By heritable, as applied to property, is meant, hat if the owner
dies intestate, the physical thing itself, or, to be accurate, the estate
the owner has in it, will go direct to his heir and not first- to his
administrator. One can ordinarily be an heir of only lands and
tenements, but heirlooms are an exception. Annuities are strictly
another exception, but those which go to the heir, although really
personal property, are usually. classed as tenements, and it is as
well to follow the ordinary classification. Heirlooms exist from
immemorial custom. They cannot be created to-day, because per-
sonal property, from its very nature, goes to the personal repre-
sentative and cannot be made to go to the heir.. An annuity is the
only kind of personal property which to-day can be made to go to
the heir; if it is settled on a man and his heirs, and the man dies
intestate, his heir will get it instead of his personal representative.
All lands and tenements, therefore, with the exception of estates
for life in tenements (and under the head of tenements, we class
annuities limited to a man and his heirs) and all personal property
which by custom comes under the head of heirlooms, descend to a
man's heir in the absence of other disposition of them by him in
1 Tiedeman on Real Property, Sec. 61 and notes.
2 Black. Com., *427.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
his lifetime, or in his will;' while in such case other property-
known as personal-goes first to the personal representative and
then after debts are paid to the next of kin specified by statute.
Hereditaments, therefore, include heirlooms, and all lands and tene-
ments except estates for life in tenements; and hereditaments are
divided into (i) corporeal hereditaments and (2) incorporeal here-
ditaments.
CORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS.
Corporeal hereditaments comprise all heritable property of a
substantial and permanent nature, such as lands, houses, mines,
woods, heirlooms, etc. Blackstone, to be sure, says that all cor-
poreal hereditaments "may be comprehended under the general
denomination of land only,"2  thereby ignoring heirlooms; but
Blackstone made this mistake because he confused heirlooms with
fixtures which go to the heir as part of the land.' So too, Kent
is wrong in saying that "corporeal hereditaments are confined to
land."' 4  Corporeal hereditaments not only comprise all heritable
property of a substantial and permanent nature, such as lands,
houses, mines, woods, heirlooms, etc., but also comprise all in-
heritable interests or estates in possession in such substantial and
permanent property, that is, all heritable estates in land which at
common law could be transferred only by livery of seisin (except,
of course, life estates which were not heritable).
Estates for less than life were not heritable and, of course, did
not come under the term hereditaments any more than life estates
did; while future interests in land, such as remainders, reversions,
executory devises, contingent uses, springing uses and shifting uses,
like equitable estates, were transferable by grant, and were, there-
fore, incorporeal interests which could in no sense be corporeal
hereditaments.
Since the words "corporeal hereditaments" include all land
except estates for life, lesser estates, equitable estates and future
1 " Heirlooms, it is held, cannot be devised or bequeathed by will, for the
technical reason that the will cannot operate until after death, whereas, the
ancient custom takes effect the instant one dies; so that the law preferring cus-
tom to the devise or bequest, they vest in the heir at once. But during his life
the owner may, of course, sell or dispose of chattels which would otherwise
descend as heirlooms."
2 2 Black. Com., *x7.
3 Chase's Blackstone, p. 536, Note 2.
4 3 Kent Com., *40.
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interests, in the physical thing land, they necessarily embrace not
only the physical thing land, but also those legal incorporeal free-
hold interests in possession in the physical thing which come within
the meaning of land, could be conveyed at common law only by
livery of seisin ' and go to the heir. The heritable incorporeal
interests in land which were created and passed by livery of seisin
at common law and which did not lie in grant are the only incor-
poreal interests which come under the head of "corporeal here-
ditaments." They come under the head of corporeal hereditaments
because the word land has an incorporeal as well as a corporeal
meaning, and because the confusion between the thing owned and
the right of ownership in it is inherent in the law of real property.
The words "corporeal hereditaments" do not include equitable
estates or incorporeal freehold estates in remainder or reversion
or future estates in use or by way of executory devise in land,
even though such estates are heritable; for those could be passed
at common law by grant without livery of seisin, and therefore were
not close enough to the possession of the physical thing land for
them to be hopelessly confused with the physical thing itself.
INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS.
Incorporeal hereditaments comprise all heritable property of an
intangible nature not already shown to be a corporeal hereditament.
In incorporeal hereditaments the heir has no right to the possession
of any particular thing corporate, as such, but only to the use,
"effects and profits" 2  of corporate things. Still in the case of
rights of way, commons, etc., it is hard to make a clear distinction
between the use of the thing and the right to the possession *of
the thing. "An incorporeal hereditament is a right issuing out of
a thing corporate (whether real or personal) or concerning or an-
nexed to or exercisable within the same. It is not the thing corpo-
1 It will be noticed that I am particular to except from the classification of
corporeal hereditaments those incorporeal interests in land which, while
regarded as interests in possession in land are yet subject to chattel interests of
such a nature that the interests in possession may be conveyed by grant. "An
estate of freehold is said to be in possession, although it is subject to an
existing prior chattel interest." (6 Am. & Engl. Ency. of Law, ist Ed., p.
896); but such estates in possession, if inheritable, must be classed as incor-
poreal hereditaments because conveyable by grant. The fact, that with the
consent of the tenant for years such freehold estates could be conveyed by
livery of seisin does not justify classifying them with corporeal hereditaments,
for they are remainders or reversions and as such incorporeal hereditaments.
2 2 Black. Com., *2o.
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rate itself . . . but something collateral thereto . . . [Incorpo-
real hereditaments] exist merely in idea and abstracted contempla-
tion, though their effects and profits may be frequently objects of our
bodily senses."' "Incorporeal tenements and hereditaments comprise
certain inheritable rights, which are not strictly speaking, of a
corporeal nature or land, although they are, by their own
nature, or by use, annexed to corporeal inheritances and
are rights issuing out of them or concern them. They pass by
deed without livery because they are not tangible rights."2  An
incorporeal hereditament cannot be perceived by the senses-being
a mere legal right of one kind or another-and, therefore, at common
law, no livery of seisin of it could be had. It passed at common
law by delivery of the deed of grant, and for that reason all in-
corporeal hereditaments "as advowsons, commons, rents, reversions,
etc., [are said] to lie in grant."' 3
Under the head of incorporeal hereditaments are included all
equitable estates of inheritance and all future estates of inheritance
in lands, whether in reversion or remainder or limited to take effect
by executory devise or contingent, shifting, or springing use. But
incorporeal and inheritable present estates of possession in land
fall under the head of corporeal hereditaments, unless they are
subject to some existing prior chattel interest which permits them
to be conveyed by grant, in which latter case, they fall, like other
remainders and reversions, under the head of incorporeal heredita-
ments.
Incorporeal hereditaments, therefore, include all heritable rights,
except those inheritable incorporeal freehold estates in possession
in tenements, which, at common law, could be transferred only by
livery of seisin. The heritable incorporeal estates just excepted, and
the corporeal things which are the subject of heritable rights, fall
under the head 'of corporeal hereditaments.
In Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence, the author attacks the
division by common law writers of hereditaments into corporeal
and incorporeal. For instance, in Lecture 13, in unnumbered
paragraph 32, he says: "In the English law we have the same
jargon about 'incorporeal things'-With us all rights and obliga-
tions are not incorporeal things; but certain rights are styled in-
1 2 Black. Corn., *2o.
2 3 Kent's Com., *402.
3 2 Black. CoM., *317.
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corporeal hereditaments, and are opposed by that name to here-
ditantents corporeal. That is to say rights of a certain species, or
rather of numerous and very different species, are absolutely opposed
to the things (strictly so called) which are the subjects -or matter
of rights of another species.
"The word 'hereditament' is evidently taken in two senses in
the two phrases which stand to denote the species of hereditaments.
A corporeal hereditament is the thing itself which is the subject
of the right; an incorporeal hereditament is not the subject -of the
right but the right itself."
Great as is the objection on which Mr. Austin insisted in the
above passage, how much greater would have been his condemna-
tion of the classification had he realized that besides opposing
certain incorporeal rights in things to the things which are the
subjects of the rights, it also identifies certain other incorporeal
rights with the things which are the subjects of the rights, and
calls those" other incorporeal rights "corporeal hereditaments."
DEFINITION OF REAL PROPERTY.
We have now concluded our scrutiny of the phrase "lands,
tenements and hereditaments" and are in a position to give a com-
prehensive definition of "real property," namely:
Real property consists of lands, tenements and hereditaments,
that is, it consists of any ground, soil or earth whatsoever, together
with everything in, on and over that ground, soil -or earth that goes
with it, together with all freehold interests in possession in it
which at common law could be conveyed only by livery of. seisin,
together with all present equitable' freehold interests in it, together
with all legal and all equitable life estates in reversion or remainder
in it, or limited to take effect in it in the future by executory devise,
or by contingent, springing or shifting use, together with all incorpo-
real hereditaments (which include all future interests, whether legal
or equitable, larger than for life) and together with heirlooms. All
of these except heirlooms are tenements, and all except life estates
in tenements are hereditaments.
But it is not enough to stop with this definition. Our definition
of real property must be supplemented by one of personal property.
'Equitable freehold estates are certainly real property-McKeithan v.
Walker, 66 No. Car. 95 at page 97. See Wall v. Fairly, 67 No. Car. io5.
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PERSONAL PROPERTY.
Personal property is all property corporeal and incorporeal
which is not real property; that is, all property which is not covered
by the words "lands, tenements and hereditaments." The old term
for personal property was "goods and chattels."
The word chattels covers all personal property. A chattel is
any species of personal property, that is, it is any species of property
which, on the death of its owner, whether testate or intestate, goes
directly to his personal representatives, and only after his debts
are paid goes to the persons designated by statute or by his will.
Just as we found that "land" meant both corporeal things and
certain incorporeal interests in corporeal things, we now find that
"chattel" embraces both corporeal things and certain incorporeal
interests in corporeal things. "Chattel" means, at common law,
any species of property which is not an heirloom nor an incorporeal
hereditament (including under this head, an annuity limited to an
annuitant and his heirs) nor a freehold in land; and chattels are
divided into (i) chattels personal and (2) chattels real.
CIIATTELS PERSONAI.
Chattels personal include all corporeal things which are not
real property, and such incorporeal things other than chattels real,
and other than incorporeal hereditaments as in contemplation of
law follow the person of the owner. Chattels personal are, in a
word, all chattels which are not heirlooms, incorporeal heredita-
ments or chattels real.
CHATTELS REAL.
Chattels real are such as "savour of the realty," by which is
meant that such chattels are interests in lands. They are interests
in land which, because not incorporeal hereditaments, do not go to
the heir, and, because, not freehold estates in land, do not come
under the head of land. Chattels real are in a word all uninheritable
interests in land less than a freehold.
At common law ,prior to the American Revolution', chattels real
comprised (I) estates or terms for years (2) estates from year
to year (3) estates at will (4) estates at sufferance (5) estates by
Statute Merchant (6) estates by Statute Staple and (7) estates
by elegit. Of these, the first four alone concern us to-day; and
to explain the way in which such leasehold interests came to be
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treated as chattels and not as real estate, necessitates a brief refer-
ence to the feudal system.
Under the feudal system, as it was introduced into England, a
life estate in land was considered the least estate which was worthy
of the acceptance of a free man; and, consequently, was the least
estate which could constitute a freehold. Lesser interests than life
interests were turned over to peasants and other persons who per-
formed base services. Such lesser interests, not being freehold,
were known as leasehold interests.
The earlier leasehold interests were on farms, and that is why
"the word farm applies as well to anything let on lease, or let to
farm as to a farm-house and the lands belonging to it."
1  Farm-
ing, in feudal days, required so little capital that the lessees "were
considered as bailiffs or servants of the lord, holding possession of
the land jiire alieno and not jure proprio, who were to receive, and
had contracted for, the profits at a settled price rather than as
having any property of their own. '  Indeed, it was not until
about the time of Edward I. that "estates for years seem to have
become of importance and to have been considered, after entry
made, as actual interests in the land vested in the lessee."' Even
then, and of course before, if the tenant was deprived of his land,
his only remedy was a personal action against his landlord for
breach of the latter's covenant in the lease for quiet enjoyment.
"The farmer could be scarcely said to be the owner of the land,
even for the term of years of the lease; for his interest wanted
the essential incident of real property, the capability of being re-
stored to its owner. Such Ln interest in the land had, moreover,
nothing military or feudal in its nature, and was, consequently,
exempt from the feudal law of descent to the eldest son as heir
at law. Being thus neither real property nor feudal tenement,
it could be no more than a chattel."4
The tenant's personal action against his landlord for breach of
the latter's covenant in the lease for quiet enjoyment was a contract
right, in other words, and as such went to the administrator or
executor of the tenant on the tenant's death; and the whole term
for years was, therefore, held to go to the tenant's personal repre-
sentative. As all property that went to the administrator or
I Williams on Real Property (6th Ed.), *9.
2 ' Washburn Real Property (5th Ed.) p. 463, *290.
3 Ibid.
4Williams on Real Property (6th Ed.), *9-io.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
executor of a deceased person was ipso facto personalty, terms
for years were held to be personal property. And as terms for
years were so held, lesser leasehold interests, namely, estates at
will, from year to year, and at sufferance, were likewise held to
be personal property or chattels. As estates at will and at suffer-
ance do not survive the death of the sole tenant, they cannot go io
his personal representatives; but estates from year to year do
survive and go to the tenant's personal representatives just as do
estates for years, and estates at will and at sufferance are classed
with them as chattels. All these estates at sufferance, at will, from
year to year, and for years, came to be regarded as we have seen,
as chattels; but because they were interests in real property, they
were known as "chattels real." Even after a succession of remedial
acts of Parliament had given a lessee for years who had been
deprived of possession of the land, a mode of regaining the leased
premises,' leasehold interests continued to be chattels. Leasehold
interests are still personal property in those common law States
which have not made them by statute real estate.
Personal property, therefore, consists of all corporeal and in-
corporeal property which is not real property, that is, it consists
of all interests in land less than a freehold that are not incorporeal
hereditaments, of all chattels personal which have not, by custom,
become heirlooms, and of all annuities which are not expressly
worded to go to the heirs of the annuitants. Real property, we
have already defined.
"A form of action of covenant was the first devised, whereby the tenant
might demand his term as well as damages, but could only maintain it against
his immediate covenantor. In the time of Henry I I I the writ of Quare ejecit
infra terminum was framed, which lay against any one in possession of the
land, and upon a judgment in the termor's favor, he recovered possession of
the land itself. But this writ did not reach a case where a stranger had en-
tered and tortiously ousted the tenant, and in such cases his only remedy was
to sue for possession in the name of his lessor. In the time of Edw. III, the
writ of ejecirnent, substantially like that now in use [see i Gray's Cases on
Property, page x,] was invented and so shaped as to enable the tenant of a term
to recover it, when deprived of the possession of the premises leased. And in
this way, at last, tenants for years were placed upon the same level with free-
holders, in regard to the security of their estates, and their remedy for recover-
ing them, if dispossessed thereof * * . But it was not before
the time of Henry VI that the plaintiff in ejectment recovered the term. At
and after that time he recovered this and with it the possession of the land, if
his term had not expired; and if it had elapsed, he recovered damages."-
i Washburn on Real Property (5th Ed.), p. 464, *29I.
CLASSIFICATION OF REAL PROPERTY.
SUGGESTIONS.
We emerge from our career of defining with the feeling that it
is no wonder that so many students of the law of real property
are unable to tell just what they have been studying. Of course,
the law of real property is what, historically, it has developed into,
and definitions of real property are what the nature of the growth
of that law has made them; but the question is nevertheless open,
can nothing be done to simplify the treatment of real property? It
seems to me that much can be done, both in the way of definition
and of classification.
In the first place, why not insist from the start that the law of
real property relates to all interests in the physical thing known as
land? As it is to-day, a writer on real property has to explain
carefully that the interests in land known as chattels real are not
real property, and yet has to treat them fully.
In the second place, why not relegate the subject of heirlooms
to the law of personal property where it naturally belongs?
In the third place, why not give up entirely the old misleading
classification of corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments? We have
seen that it is wrong to set off rights in things against the things
which are the subject of the rights, and that as a matter of fact,
the phrase corporeal hereditaments is misleading, because it includes
certain incorporeal heritable interests in land. For the sake of
simplicity and of clearness, let the classification be abandoned, and
let the word "corporeal" cover, as it properly does, only tangible,
physical things.
In the fourth and last place, why not leave to other subjects,
such as personal property, corporations, etc., the consideration of
those incorporeal things, such as annuities, franchises, etc., which
are not interests in land and yet are now grouped in the law of
real property under the head of incorporeal hereditaments.
If we do all these things, how comprehensive and simple then
are our definitions, namely:
(I) Real property consists of any ground, soil or earth what-
soever, together with everything in, on or over it that goes with it,
together with every kind of an incorporeal interest in it;
(2) Personal property consists of all property which is not
real property, and includes heirlooms, annuities limited to the heir,
etc., which have, heretofore, been treated under the head of real
property;
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(3) Of real property, those interests in land, less than a free-
hold, which have not heretofore been classed as incorporeal heredita-
ments, go to the personal representative instead of to the heir; and
of personal property, heirlooms, annuities limited to the heir, etc.,
go to the heir instead of to the personal representative.
And how simple then is our fundamental classification of real
property. Instead of dividing our subject into (i) estates for life
in tenements (2) corporeal hereditaments (3) incorporeal heredita-
ments, and throwing in apologetically as (4) chattels real, we have
two main divisions: (i) real property which goes to the heir, and
(2) real property which does not go to the heir. And we have
corresponding simplicity throughout.
The net result obtained means nothing to the practicing lawyer,
perhaps, but to law students it should and doubtless will prove
decidedly helpful. The law of real property cannot be made easy
of comprehension but it may be made less difficult. And one
way of making it less difficult, for students at least, is to adopt
some such clear definitions and classification as are herein contended
for. The change in the substance of the law oi real property which
has been wrought by legislation, should be accompanied by a change
in the legal definition and classification of real property.
Geo. P. Costigan, Jr.
